INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing the slow, painful, unraveling of a world order in which nation states, jealous of their sovereignty, could plausibly claim to control the right to enter and remain within the national territory. Political leaders continue to assure us that they can "secure the borders" and eliminate unauthorized immigration, but it is increasingly obvious that these are unachievable goals.
Porous borders and transnational affiliations are realities of our times (Benhabib 2005) . The call to put more "boots on the ground" in border areas has nevertheless become a potent political rallying cry in many nations of the world, reflecting widespread anxiety about national security and seemingly uncontrolled and uncontrollable changes in economy and society.
The nation state's inability to live up to its promises of a secure border is felt most keenly in border communities, which are crossing points for unauthorized immigrants on their way to other destinations, as well as places of temporary and permanent settlement (Rojas 2007) . In the borderlands, unauthorized immigration is perceived as a local issue, with implications for public services, public safety, and the local economy. The isolation of these communities, typically far from national capitals, encourages practices suited to local circumstances and may spur resistance to outside intervention (Andreas 2001) . It is worthwhile, therefore to consider how center and periphery 3 communicate with each other in matters related to unauthorized immigration, and in particular, how border localities make their voices heard at the national level.
The ability of these communities to speak effectively to national policy makers depends on whether local political institutions are strong enough to formulate a coherent position and communicate it upwards. The United States is distinctive in this respect. Alexis de Tocqueville, touring the United States in the early 1800s, noted its dense network of local institutions and elaborate system of local government. These characteristics have endured. The federal government routinely relies on local administration to carry out some policies. A recent immigration-related example is the Secure Communities Program, which requires that localities report to federal authorities all suspected unauthorized immigrants booked into local jails. The dense network of local institutions and habits of inter-level communication also facilitate the expression of local dissatisfaction with national policy. The United States may be unusual, in other words, not in its level of racialized anxiety about unauthorized immigration, but in the ability of its people, through local government, to make their concerns felt at higher levels.
The effort to explain the rapid rise in local immigration-policy activism in the United States has engaged American scholars on several fronts. Some argue that local laws hostile toward unauthorized immigrants are a reaction to rapid settlement in "new destinations" (e.g. Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008) .
Others assert the significance of Republican dominance in producing such time attempting to increase foreign trade and investment, attract highly skilled workers, and facilitate tourism. These contradictory national demands, along with pressure to retain a decent human-rights record in an era of growing economic inequality and desperation, are negotiated on a daily basis in borderlands. At the national level, however, the contradictions of actual border management tend to be poorly understood or completely unappreciated.
The southern borders of Mexico and the United States have taken on new significance as both nations have prioritized immigration enforcement. The first task of this article is to look more closely at this development from a local perspective. The next step is to analyze the opportunities and constraints that shape local protest directed at national decision-makers. A major constraint, of course, is the assertion by national governments of their sovereignty in matters related to immigration, an assertion that applies, not just to domestic courts and to foreign nations, but also to all governmental units under the national umbrella.
The capacity of central government to control its outermost regions, however, and the degree to which it must listen to these regions, is variable over time and space, and so should be considered a matter for empirical investigation.
While our comparative case study of Arizona and Chiapas reveals significant differences in the capacity of these local communities to effectively voice opposition to national policy, there is a striking similarity in the preference of activists in each place for legalized styles of protest. This preference for law 6 may be traceable in part to the fact that governance in large contemporary states encompasses multiple levels of law, creating a kind of officially sanctioned legal pluralism. Meta-national human-rights norms and institutions add to this layering, creating opportunities to challenge political decisions through law.
Legalized forms of protest also attract activists because of law's normative dimension. Law inserts a moral "ought" into political protest and evokes the idea of rights, a framing that can be useful in legislative lobbying, media campaigns, and public protest (McCann 2006) . In the process legal consciousness deepens and spreads, even in nations with more centralization than prevails in the United
States (e.g. Chua 2012 ).
Immigration enforcement is a complex matter in border areas. Licit and illicit trade across national boundaries can create an insular local economy or even a "semi-autonomous social field" (Moore 1973 ) that resists external oversight because not all of its practices would be sanctioned by the broader legal system (Andreas 2001) . Isolation from the national mainstream can also foster a sense among residents that they have been neglected and deemed unimportant (Nevins 2002 ). Familial and ethnic relations and residues of a pre-bordered past further complicate the local mindset. Johnson and Graybill (2010) argue for taking this perspective more seriously, recognizing the contingent nature of the nation state and the importance of sub-national histories in defining it.
7
Arizona and Chiapas furnish apt exemplars, steeped as they have been in cross-border trade, work, and settlement, and operating with memories of a long pre-enforcement history. In both cases large indigenous populations settled in the area before the two nations created a legal border. For many decades, both indigenous and non-indigenous populations carried on their activities without much interference from federal authorities. Businesses depended on visitors from the other side. In Arizona during the World War I era, US authorities did try to control the border because of security concerns. Two federal statutes designed to seal the border, the Immigration Act of 1917 and the Passport Act of 1918, reflect this intention. But Kang's review of the files of federal agents stationed on the Southwest border reveals angry protests from locals and requests for exceptions that soon swamped federal strictures, re-establishing earlier patterns of border commerce and travel: "Indeed, throughout the agency's history, border residents have been some of the most vehement and persistent opponents of any regulation that threatened to encroach upon their freedom of movement across the international line" (Kang 181, 2010) . Between 1910 and 1920, Gatekeeper in San Diego, California, in 1994. The border's vast desert region, deemed too hostile for easy passage, was left only lightly patrolled. This approach was soon to have significant implications for Arizona, which up until that time had mostly local traffic across its southern border.
Pressure to gain more control over unauthorized immigration continued as Congress in 1996 adopted two major pieces of legislation, that, among other things, increased penalties for illegal entry, invited local participation in federal immigration enforcement, reduced immigrant rights, and attempted to reduce the "magnet" of benefits and jobs that were presumed to attract unauthorized immigrants. During this period the size and budget of the Border Patrol began to grow rapidly. (It has now quintupled, growing from about 4,000 to over 20,000 agents.) Mexico was also feeling the effect of the U.S. job magnet in the late 1990s, and increasingly finding itself receiving immigrants from Central America, mostly bound for the United States, even as more of its own nationals migrated northward. Neither of these trends was new for Mexico, but their dimensions were for the first time drawing national and international attention. The particularly human-rights standards, to argue for changes in national policy; treaty obligations and constitutional guarantees also factor into their arguments. In Chiapas, in contrast to Arizona, local legislation has been adopted that pointedly overlooks legal status. All of these activities reveal belief in the capacity of law to reframe people and their role in society in fundamental ways (de Genova 2002) , or in Coutin's words, to "define not only national borders, but also spaces of existence within national territories" (2001, 118) . Arizona and Chiapas activists would agree with Ngai (2004, 4) that it is law that makes unauthorized immigrants "impossible subjects," but they would add that law can also lend credence political arguments in the increasingly law-saturated environments in which contemporary societies operate (Hirschl 2006 , Kagan 2001 , Epp 2011 . (Perales 2013 ).
IMMIGRATION ACTIVISM IN ARIZONA
Arizona's early preoccupation with the presumed negative influence of Mexican-origin people became a distinctive feature of its politics. Conflicts were common as Anglos asserted dominance. Mexican-Americans worked in Arizona copper mines at less than half the Anglo wage, provoking strikes and labor unrest (Gordon 1999) . The reaction to strikers was often violent. In 1917, the town of Bisbee Arizona responded to demands for better wages and working conditions from miners of mostly Mexican origin by deporting over 1,000 foreign workers and their allies. With the help of the local sheriff and deputized residents, the miners were herded into manure-laden boxcars and shipped east under armed guard into the New Mexico desert, where they were abandoned, later to be rescued by U.S. soldiers stationed in the area (Bailey 1983 ). Segregation, with Mexican-Americans treated as a separate race, was legal in Arizona until 1953, when the Arizona Supreme Court declared the practice unconstitutional. Segregation had been the policy, not just in the public schools, but also at public swimming pools, parks, and churches. Neighborhoods were segregated by race, with this arrangement backed up by racially restrictive covenants in deeds. The Latino presence at the state's universities and in the professions was minimal in this period. Their presence in the state's agriculture, mining, construction, and service sectors, however, was large and economically important. Yet their numbers were easy to ignore because of their political disenfranchisement and lack of citizenship. In Arizona, as in the neighboring states of New Mexico and California, many whites regarded Mexican Americans as workers whose real roots lay in Mexico (Gomez 2007 , Chavez 2008 ).
The demise of legal segregation and rising concern about civil rights and racial discrimination changed the rules, but not the belief in powerful quarters that More generally, there appears to be a growing sense that Arizona's harsh approach to its estimated 400,000 unauthorized residents is harmful to business and a liability for office-holders. Bills directly attacking the lives of unauthorized residents were absent from the 2013 legislative session, though the legislature did adopt two laws aimed at reducing the impact of organizations focused on increasing the Latino vote. Legally imbued politics remains the preferred strategy for advocates on all sides of the Arizona immigration debate.
IMMIGRATION ACTIVISM IN CHIAPAS
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The current border between Mexico and Guatemala --over 600 miles long It's the people of Chiapas who are poor" (Farmer 1998, 14) .
In the 1980s neighboring Guatemala became embroiled in a US-backed civil war and the military began to viciously attack indigenous populations, who were believed to be sympathetic to the guerillas and to communism. Over 100,000 people were killed in the conflict and over one million people were 23 driven into exile or displaced, an estimated 200,000 of whom fled into southern Mexico (Castillo 2006) . These refugees changed Chiapas, both demographically and economically. The local economy boomed with international aid funding and the Guatemalan presence in the state became more substantial. About 22,000
Guatemalans remained, many becoming naturalized citizens.
As in the United States, the southern border of Mexico was for a long time completely unregulated, in part to facilitate cross-border trade, family connections, and a large seasonal influx of between 45,000 and 75,000 Guatemalan agricultural and domestic workers (Castillo 2006) . There are eight official crossing points along this border, but over 1,000 blind spots in the mountainous terrain, only 44 of which are accessible by vehicle. Some parts of the border are covered with dense jungle. As two reporters who traveled 500 miles of border roads in 2011
observed: "for the indigenous peoples, ranch hands and smugglers who traverse it freely, there is no border at all. It is a line on the map" (Miroff and Booth 2011) .
The emergence of concerns about border security
Mexico's national government, at US urging, now attempts to differentiate between migrants whose labor contributes to the national economy and those simply passing through or bent on criminal activities. In the 1990s Mexico Chiapas without distinction as to the migratory status of their parents. To pursue those who commit crimes against migrants, the state government created a special prosecutor. In these respects Chiapas is outpacing the federal government and, in a small way, pushing back against its laissez-faire policies.
Appeals to legality have figured prominently in all of these efforts.
Legality as an organizing principle and justification figures significantly even in some extra-legal institutions, including the unofficial crossing points, or cadenas that some communities on the border have developed. Tolls collected in this manner can amount to as much as $60,000 per year Meyers-Galemba reports.
Locals pride themselves on their honesty and transparency, noting that they offer fair value (road maintenance) for the toll, in contrast with corruption and extortion at the hands of official border agents. As one observed: "There is law here" (Meyers-Galemba 2012, 7).
FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER: SPEAKING UP THROUGH LAW
The growing power of national governments to intervene in local affairs in the name of sovereignty and security is particularly evident in border areas, but so are certain limits arising out of local desires to restore a fluid transnationalism.
The economic, social, and cultural value of easy flows across borders has not diminished with time, and has perhaps increased with globalization. The stark 33 territorial reality of borders, however, traps thinking and obscure the fundamental question we should be asking (Agnew 2008, 176, 187) : What do borders do to people and for people? I suggest that we should also be asking how borderlands residents manage the challenges thrust upon them by their national governments.
In both Chiapas and Arizona, as we have seen, the contemporary response to national immigration policies arises out of a deep reservoir of discontent with past treatment by the national government. Nor has either area benefitted from the current emphasis on securitization, with its inevitable accompaniments of increased border-related crime, drug running, corruption, and oppressive policing.
Both local economies have also suffered as controls have been tightened.
Arizona and Chiapas are responding with legalized politics and protest, albeit with very different goals in mind, as we have seen. For activists in Chiapas, the biggest obstacle is their government's inability to operate within the parameters of law. The struggle in Arizona is over whose law will prevail, the contenders being municipal, state, federal, and international human-rights law.
The availability of law on every side of the debate over border policy signifies, not just the flexibility of law, but also its plurality and our reliance upon it to justify behavior. It should not be surprising, therefore, that there is widespread public anxiety over those who "take the law into their own hands" by entering national territory without permission. Immigration policy is ripe for challenge from below because, while the plenary power of the national government has been clearly established by the courts, the effects of immigration policy are mostly felt at the local level.
If Arizona's goal was, not to replace federal law, but to move the national conversation toward a more restrictive direction, it has succeeded, at least temporarily. Consider this statement by the eight U.S. senators who in January 2013 proposed to revise federal immigration law. In it they deferred to the judgment of Arizona and other Southwest-border states:
We recognize that Americans living along the Southwest border are key to recognizing and understanding when the border is truly secure. Our legislation will create a commission comprised of governors, attorneys general, and community leaders living along the Southwest border to monitor the progress of securing our border and to make a recommendation regarding when the bill's security measures outlined in the legislation are completed (Fabian 2013 ).
In the always-controversial realm of immigration policy, this pattern of deference at the margins and control at the center is likely become the new securitization norm. For example, the increasing devolution of enforcement authority to the local level, as epitomized by the federal rollout of the Secure Communities program, actually enhances federal discretion over deportation.
Similarly in Chiapas, the decision to allow the cadenas to admit border crossers on their own terms enhances the impression of federal control by calming local protest and helping to make the official crossing points look more effective.
Nation states have never enjoyed as much power to control borders as they have claimed, but it is important to maintain that illusion. The legalized politics around the border must contend with that reality.
